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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case, this Court has 
original jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996) and the trial court's Minute Entry and Order granting Appellant's Motion to 
Extend Time to Appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by determining as a matter of law that the 
Serratos failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act under circumstances (a) where the Act is silent with 
regard to who or what is the "governing body" of the UTA and silent with regard to 
how the notice should be filed with the governing body, and (b) where the purposes 
underlying the notice of claim requirement were satisfied by the notice of claim 
filed, (c) where a UTA employee instructed the Serratos' counsel to send the notice 
of claim to the UTA Risk Manager, (d) where the UTA Board had essentially 
delegated responsibility for such claims to the UTA risk management office, and (e) 
where the UTA Board of Directors would not have actually received the notice of 
claim in any event. (R.92-122, 316) Standard of Review: Inasmuch as summary 
judgment is granted as a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court 
for correctness, while viewing the properly submitted evidence, and the facts and 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal and are set forth 
verbatim in the addendum to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13 (1993) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a personal injury dispute arising out of an automobile/bus 
accident that occurred December 17, 1996. The Serratos were injured in that 
accident as a result of their collision with a negligently operated Utah Transit 
Authority (hereinafter "UTA") bus. Settlement negotiations between the Serratos 
and the UTA ensued. A notice of claim was eventually filed with the UTA's Risk 
Manager and Claims Administrator, and a complaint was subsequently filed in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. The trial court granted UTA's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Serratos case on the basis that the 
Serratos' notice of claim was not filed with the UTA Board of Directors. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
On or about April 15, 1998, the Serratos filed a complaint alleging negligence 
against the UTA and Lance Sargent, the UTA bus driver involved. (R. 1-4) 
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The UTA and Mr. Sargent filed an answer on May 8, 1998. (R. 8-11) 
Subsequently, on July 21, 1998, the UTA and Mr. Sargent filed a motion for 
summary judgment, alleging that the Serratos failed to timely serve a notice of claim 
on the UTA Board of Directors or upon any individual Board member of the UTA. 
(R. 13-29) 
On January 14, 1999, the Serratos filed their opposition to the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment (R. 41-80) and filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, citing the Utah Savings Statue, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, which the 
Serratos argue would allow them one year to correctly file the notice of claim with 
the UTA and to file a new Complaint. (R. 84-91) 
These motions were heard by Judge Henriod on August 2, 1999. (R. 316) 
Judge Henriod subsequently granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in a final judgment and 
order entered August 26, 1999. (R. 249-251) 
This appeal ensued from that final judgment and order. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
This case involves a personal injury dispute arising out of an automobile/bus 
accident. On December 17, 1996, at approximately 6:40 am, Cristobal Serrato was 
driving his truck eastbound on 4715 South. Elida, Cristobol's wife, was riding with 
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him. At the intersection of 4420 West and 4715 South, a Utah Transit Authority 
("UTA") bus turned left in front of the Serrato's vehicle. (R. 179-80) 
Both Cristobal and Elida were injured in this accident, and they subsequently 
brought a personal injury action against the UTA and Lance K. Sargent. (R. 1-4) 
On or about December 7, 1997, the Serratos, through counsel, mailed a 
Notice of Claim for Injury addressed to Steven Cain, the UTA's Risk Manager, and 
David Pitcher, the UTA's only Claims Administrator, and to Utah Attorney 
General, Jan Graham. (R. 179-80) A true and correct copy is attached at the 
addendum to this brief. 
Counsel for the Serratos addressed the notice following a telephone 
conversation with an individual in the UTA office who instructed Steven Paul, one 
of the Serratos' attorneys, to send the notice of claim to Mr. Cain, the UTA's Risk 
Manager. (R. 182-183) 
Another copy of the notice of claim for injury was served by process server 
upon the UTA and was received by Michele Dutcher, safety and loss administrator 
at the UTA. (R. 183) 
Prior to this time, the UTA's risk management office had been actively 
involved in attempting to negotiate a settlement regarding the Serratos' claims. (R. 
191,depo. p.27) 
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The UTA Board of Directors has essentially delegated the authority to 
investigate and settle all personal injury claims against the UTA to its risk 
management office and to its attorneys. (R. 210, depo. p.53, R. 225-26, depo. pp. 
7-8) 
The Board does not engage in any substantive discussions regarding the injury 
claims pending against the UTA, nor does the Board advise risk management with 
respect to handling claims, nor does the Board advise whether to accept or reject 
settlements offered. (R. 224-26, 231, depo. pp. 6-8, 13) 
Even if the Serratos' notice of claim had been addressed to the "UTA Board 
of Directors," it is extremely unlikely that any actual Board member would have 
seen or read the notice inasmuch as any notice of claim is redirected to others by 
those receiving the Board's mail. (R. 200-01, depo. pp. 16-19, R. 231-32, depo. 
pp. 13-14) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
require that a notice of claim be timely filed with the "governing body" of a political 
subdivision of the state, such as the UTA. While the UTA's governing body is its 
Board of Directors, the Serratos filed their notice of claim with the UTA's Risk 
Manager and its Claims Administrator. 
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Nevertheless, when viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the Serratos, this Court must conclude that the Serratos' filing satisfied the purposes 
underlying the notice of claim statute of assuring that a claim can be investigated, 
evaluated and settled, and that the governmental entity be given notice of any 
defective condition. The UTA's department of risk management which fulfills these 
aforementioned duties did in fact receive the notice. 
Moreover, when viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the Serratos, this Court must conclude that the Serratos were justified in sending 
their notice of claim to the aforementioned individuals. It is extremely difficult to 
discern from the statutes who is the UTA's governing body, let alone how to serve 
that body. In addition, a UTA employee directed Serratos' counsel over the 
telephone to file the notice of claim with the UTA Risk Manager, which the Serratos 
proceeded to do. Inasmuch as the risk management department is essentially the 
Board's agents with respect to investigating and settling injury claims against the 
UTA, filing the notice of claim with key individuals in that department seems a most 
reasonable choice. 
Furthermore, a notice of claim addressed to the "UTA Board of Directors" 
would not have been seen or read by any actual Board Member. In other words, 
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requiring the Serratos to send their notice only to the Board would be to require the 
performance of a futile or vain act, which the law abhors. 
Under the precedence set by this Court in Bischel v. Merritt. 907 P.2d 275 
(Utah App. 1995), and by the Utah Supreme Court in Larson v. Park City Mun. 
Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998), this Court should validate the Serratos' filing of 
their notice of claim and reverse the trial court's adverse judgment. 
Finally, if the Serratos' case must be dismissed for failure to direct the notice 
of claim to the UTA Board of Directors, then section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code, 
the "savings statute," should apply inasmuch as the dismissal is not based upon the 
underlying merits of the Serratos' injury claims and their complaint was timely filed. 
Accordingly, the Serratos should be allowed to refile the notice of claim and 
commence a new action against the UTA and its employee. 
ARGUMENT 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Glover 
v. Bov Scouts of Am.. 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the trial 
court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 
1374 (Utah 1994). Moreover, "[b]ecause disposition of a case on summary 
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judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions 
of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, 
should be resolved in favor of the opposing party." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson 
Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1989); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (All "[d]oubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."). 
In light of the facts and circumstances involved in this dispute, and in view of 
prior case law addressing similar situations, the trial court erred in concluding that 
the Serratos had not properly filed their notice of claim as is required as a 
precondition to suit. 
I. Notice of Claim Requirements. 
Pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (hereinafter "the Act"), an 
injured party like the Serratos had to first file a "written notice of claim" with the 
appropriate governmental entity before initiating a law suit against the governmental 
entity for the injury. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (1993). Furthermore, if the 
injured party's claim was against a "political subdivision," such as the UTA, or 
against its employee, then the notice of claim needed to be filed "with the governing 
body of the political subdivision within one year" after the claim arose. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). 
Indeed, f?[s]trict compliance with the notice requirement has typically been 
necessary to maintain an action" against a governmental entity. Brittain v. State, 
882 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1994). "Unfortunately, the term 'governing body' is 
not defined within the Act itself." Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 
345 (Utah 1998). In addition, "[t]he statute does not prescribe a specific manner or 
method for filing notice with the governing body of the political subdivision." 
Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah App. 1995). 
Accordingly, considerable confusion has been fostered and litigation 
engendered concerning exactly who should receive a notice of claim, and how the 
notice should be filed. See id.: Larson, 955 P.2d at 345. Such confusion has led 
many claimants into the trap of "peppering the valley with notices of claim and 
hoping one will hit close to the mark." Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 
1294, 1298 n.3 (Utah App. 1996). 
II. Utah Courts Have Validated the Filing of Notice of Claim to 
Persons Other than the "Governing Body" of a Political Subdivision. 
Justly and equitably, the Act's general silence with regard to how, or in what 
manner, a governing body of a political subdivision should be served has led Utah's 
appellate courts to validate the delivery of an otherwise proper notice of claim in 
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some situations when the actual governing body was not sent the notice. See, e.g., 
Larson. 955 P.2d at 345-46; BischeL 907 P.2d at 278-79. 
In BischeL this Court upheld the filing of a notice of claim under section 63-
30-13 with an assistant county attorney, rather than with the actual governing body, 
the Salt Lake County Commission. 907 P.2d 278-79. More recently, in Larson, 
the Utah Supreme Court accepted the filing of a notice of claim with the Park City 
recorder, rather than with the actual governing body, the city council. 955 P.2d at 
345-46. In both of these cases, the appellate court determined that the essential 
purposes underlying the statutory notice requirement had been met and that other 
factual circumstances involved justified the claimants sending the notices to the 
persons they did instead of to the actual governing body of the political subdivision 
involved. See icL; BischeL 907 P.2d at 278-79. 
These same factors are involved in this case. The UTA does not dispute that 
the Serratos' notice of claim met the strict form, content, and time requirements of 
sections 63-30-11 and -13. It only complains that the notice was not directed to the 
UTA's board of directors. Nevertheless, when viewing the facts and reasonable 
inferences in the Serratos' favor, this Court must conclude that delivery of the notice 
to the UTA's Risk Manager and its Claims Administrator (1) satisfied the purposes 
for giving notice of a claim and (2) was justified by the unique factual underpinnings 
of this case. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that the Serratos' filing of the 
notice of claim was fatally defective. 
III. The Serratos1 Notice Satisfied the Purposes of the Statute. 
A. The purposes underlying the Actfs notice of claim requirements. 
As explained by several Utah courts, "[i]t is necessary to consider the policy 
of the notice requirement so that in any particular case the facts can be evaluated to 
determine if the intent of the statute has been accomplished." Stahl v. Utah Transit 
AutlL, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980) (quoted in Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278; Brittain, 
882P.2dat670). 
It has long been accepted that 
"the primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the 
responsible public authority an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely 
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public 
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." 
Bischel. 907 P.2d at 278 (quoting Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671). Moreover, Utah 
courts have suggested that filing a written notice helps preserve a record that will 
minimize difficulties arising from changes in administrations and also helps prevent 
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the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a claimant's recollection of 
events. IdL 
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded on these purposes, declaring 
that "the purpose of such notice of claim is to provide the governmental entity an 
opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and 
perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation." Larson. 955 P.2d at 
345-46. As was determined in Larson and BischeL the primary purposes for 
requiring the notice of claim have all been met in this case. 
B. Sending the notice of claim to the UTA's risk manager and to its claims 
administrator satisfied the objectives of the statute. 
The court in Bischel found the purposes of providing notice had been met 
because the party "entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim 
received the requisite notice well within the one-year period imposed by the statute." 
907 P.2d at 278. The very same conclusion had been previously reached by the 
Brittain court when the notice was sent to the Utah Division of Risk Management. 
882 P.2d at 672 (concluding that the purposes for providing notice had been satisfied 
when the entity "entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim 
received the requisite notice in a timely manner"). Finally, the Utah Supreme Court 
also concluded under analogous circumstances that because an insurance adjuster for 
the UTA's insurer (who was "the person entrusted with the investigation and 
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settlement procedures") had timely received the requisite information, the purpose of 
the notice of claim requirement had been adequately met. Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 
(involving a former statute requiring a claim to be presented within 30 days of the 
injury). 
When viewing the facts and inferences in a light favorable to the Serratos in 
this case, there can be little doubt that the purposes of providing the notice of claim 
had been satisfied. Steven Cain, the UTA Risk Manager, and David Pitcher, the 
UTA's claims administrator, both received the notice of claim directed to them. (R. 
14) The facts support the conclusion that the UTA's board of directors had delegated 
its responsibilities for pursuing a proper and timely investigation, for correcting any 
defective condition, and for evaluating and settling any claim, to its office of risk 
management, headed by Steven Cain. (R. 186, depo. p. 5, R. 210, depo. p.53, R. 
225-26, depo. pp. 7-8) 
In addition, David Pitcher's responsibilities as the UTA's only claims 
administrator are very comparable to those of the insurance adjuster who had 
received the requisite information in Stahl, which the Supreme Court considered in 
that case sufficient to satisfy the notice of claim requirement. 
Indeed, the manner in which the Serratos' notice of claim was addressed to 
the UTA in no way inhibited the possibility of settlement and made no substantive 
14 
difference in the way the claim was or should have been handled. The UTA has 
made no real attempt to argue otherwise. In fact, the UTA had already offered a 
sizeable sum of money to settle the Serratos1 claims based upon its investigation and 
evaluation already in progress. Moreover, by receiving a written notice of claim, 
the UTA was adequately put on notice of any defective condition that needed to be 
corrected, and was further put on notice of the imminent likelihood of litigation, 
thus assuring that the UTA would have the opportunity to try to settle the matter 
without having to expend entrusted public funds in costly and unnecessary litigation 
if it chose to do so. 
IV. Additional and Unique Factors Justify the Serratos1 Decision to Serve the 
UTAfs Risk Manager and Claims Administrator. 
Additional and unique factors in fact justify the Serratos' decision to serve 
their notice of claim upon Steven Cain and David Pitcher, similar to those factors 
previously influencing this Court in Bischel and the Utah Supreme Court in Larson. 
It is not easy to determine who or what is the UTA's "governing body" from the 
applicable statutes. In addition, a UTA employee directed one of the Serratos1 
attorneys to send the notice of claim to the UTA Risk Manager. This would seem to 
be the entirely sensible thing to do inasmuch as the UTA has clearly delegated its 
responsibilities for handling the claims to its risk management office and legal 
department, while maintaining minimum oversight. 
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Moreover, a notice of claim properly mailed and addressed to the UTA's 
"Board of Directors" would not have actually been seen or reviewed by any member 
of the board of directors, but would have been redirected by those handling the 
UTA's mail. Accordingly, affirming the dismissal of the Serratos' case for failure 
to address the notice and envelope to the "Board of Directors" would effectively 
deny the general legal and equitable principles established in the Larson and Bischel 
cases, would elevate sheer literalism over substance, and, in this case of serving the 
notice upon the UTA, would require the performance of an essentially futile act. 
A. It is not readily discernable who or what is the "governing body" of the 
UTA. 
The notice of claim statutes in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act engender 
considerable confusion, even for attorneys who are professionally trained to know 
the law. In his deposition, David Pitcher testified that approximately one-third of 
the notices of claims directed to the UTA in the two years leading up to this case 
had been misdirected even though almost all had been handled by attorneys. (R. 
204-05, 207, depo. pp. 31-34, 43-44) 
If a claimant is able to correctly determine that the Utah Transit Authority is a 
"public transit district," included within the definition of "political subdivision" 
found in section 63-30-2 of the Utah Code, and that the Utah Transit Authority is 
not an "authority," as is included in the definition of "state" within that same 
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section, then that individual might properly determine that section 63-30-13 applies 
to filing a notice of claim with the UTA rather than section 63-30-12, as counsel for 
the Serratos mistakenly determined at the time. 
Even so, the confusion and ambiguity is further compounded by the fact that 
the claimant is then instructed to file the notice of claim with "the governing body" 
of the political subdivision. As has been previously established, the term 
"governing body" is not defined in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Accordingly, the claimant would need to discover that the UTA was created 
pursuant to the Utah Public Transit District Act (hereinafter the "UPTDA"), 
beginning with section 17A-2-1001 of the Utah Code. Unfortunately, even if that 
discovery is made, the term "governing body" is still not found in the definitions 
section of that UPTDA, nor anywhere else in that Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-
2-1004. Indeed, a claimant would need to scour the UPTDA to discover that a 
public transit district has a "board of directors," which shall be "the legislative 
body" of the district, with certain "powers, privileges, and duties" to perform. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-2-1038 & -1039. 
In other words, while no one now disputes that the UTA's Board of Directors 
is in fact its "governing body," that fact is not readily discemable from the relevant 
statutes. Identifying that the UTA Board of Directors should receive the notice is 
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akin to a basketball player hitting a jump shot forty feet from the hoop-even the best 
players will have a difficult time hitting the shot consistently. 
It should be noted that even the Supreme Court seemed to sympathize with the 
claimant in Larson for having to discern Park City's governing body, even though 
the term "governing body" is actually defined in the Utah Municipal Code, and even 
though it would seem to be more common knowledge who governs a city than who 
governs the UTA. See Larson. 955 P.2d at 345-46. 
Lastly, neither the Governmental Immunity Act nor the UPTDA states "how 
or in what manner a notice of claim should be filed" with the UTA Board of 
Directors. CL idL at 345. "In deciding how to file a notice of claim . . . to satisfy 
the Act, a claimant has no other choice but to rely upon the statutes and upon the 
purpose of the notice statute in deciding how, and upon whom, such a notice of 
claim is to be filed." IdL at 346. As has been demonstrated, this is certainly no easy 
task. 
B. An employee of the UTA directed Serratos1 counsel to file the claim with the 
UTA Risk Manager, 
Inasmuch as " [t]he statute does not prescribe a specific manner or method for 
filing notice with the governing body of the political subdivision," BischeL 907 P.2d 
at 278, the claimant in Bischel "did an entirely sensible thing and called the 
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commission to ask for instructions." Bellonio. 911 P.2d at 1297 (describing what 
took place in Bischel). 
By the same token, Steven Paul, one of the Serratos' attorneys in this case, 
did the same sensible thing and telephoned the UTA to seek instructions regarding to 
whom the actual notice of claim should be delivered. (R. 182) Mr. Paul was 
advised by someone at the UTA office who purported to have knowledge that Steven 
Cain, the UTA's Risk Manager, was authorized to accept the notice of claim. (R. 
183) Just as this Court similarly concluded in Bischel, the instruction to Mr. Paul 
was certainly reasonable given the role the UTA's risk management office plays in 
investigating and evaluating claims and recommending settlements. See Bischel, 
907P.2dat278. 
In Bischel, this Court also noted that it was "at best disingenuous for the 
County to argue that Bischel's notice was inadequate merely because she directed 
and delivered it as . . . instructed." IdL at 279. The same estoppel-type argument 
relied upon by this Court in Bischel should apply to the Serratos' case, especially 
when viewing the facts and inferences in the Serratos' favor. Cf, Johnson v. City of 
Bountiful 996 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that defendant city was 
estopped from raising plaintiff's failure to comply with notice of claim requirement 
as defense under facts unique to case); Rice v. Granite School Dist.. 456 P.2d 159 
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(Utah 1969) (concluding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether acts of 
school district's agent were such that district should be estopped from asserting 
statute of limitations defense). Indeed, a governmental entity like the UTA should 
not be able to benefit from one of its own employees providing misinformation to a 
member of the public. 
C. The UTA board of directors has delegated the handling of claims to its risk 
management office. 
Another factor justifying filing the notice with the UTA's Risk Manager and 
Claims Administrator is the practical reality that the UTA's board of directors has 
delegated the task of investigating, evaluating, and negotiating personal injury 
claims to the UTA's office of risk management, in which key roles are played by the 
Risk Manager, who heads the office, and the Claims Administrator, who is involved 
in the processing of such claims. These are, of course, the same individuals who 
actually received the Serratos' notice of claim. 
The Board of Directors has directly authorized the risk management 
department to fulfill these duties. (R. 210, depo. p.53, R. 225-26, depo. pp. 7-8) 
Moreover, in the two years preceding this case, the Board has never been directly 
involved in evaluating or settling a personal injury claim, nor has the Board ever 
disagreed with the risk management department's recommendations or handling of 
any claim. (R. 186-87, 191, depo. pp. 8-10, 26-27; R. 200, depo. pp. 13-14) 
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In light of the fact that the UTA's Office of Risk Management is essentially 
the Board's agent with respect to the investigation, evaluation, and settlement of 
claims, the Serratos were entirely justified in delivering notice to the key individuals 
within that office. A significant relationship exists between the UTA's Board of 
Directors and its Office of Risk Management with respect to injury claims against 
the UTA. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a "city recorder has such a 
significant relationship with the city council [the governing body of that political 
subdivision] that one would be justified in filing notice of claim with the recorder." 
Larson. 955 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added). The city recorder in Larson was not the 
city's governing body. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the municipal statutes 
required duties of the recorder that in essence created such a relationship with the 
actual governing body that filing a notice of claim with the recorder effectively 
constituted filing with the city council. Id. 
Although not based upon any statute, the UTA Board and its office of risk 
management do have a "significant relationship" with regard to the processing of 
injury claims against the UTA. When viewing the facts and inferences in favor of 
the Serratos, this Court should conclude that the risk management office is for all 
effects and purposes the agent of the Board with respect to such claims. Just as the 
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Larson court justified a misdirected filing upon the significant relationship between 
the recipient and the governing body, so too should this Court justify the Serratos' 
filing with the UTA Risk Manager and Claims Administrator. Indeed, the 
justification in this case would seem even stronger than in Larson because 
relationship established within the UTA is actually related to the handling of claims. 
D. The actual UTA Board of Directors would never have seen nor reviewed the 
Serratos1 notice of claim even if it was addressed to the UTA's "Board of 
Directors". 
A final factor that should weigh in the Serratos' favor is the fact that, even if 
their notice of claim had been specifically addressed to the "UTA Board of 
Directors," it is extremely unlikely that any actual board member would have even 
seen, let alone have read, the Serratosf notice. Mailing the notice is all that is 
required to file a notice of claim with the UTA. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(1) 
(1993). Nevertheless, a notice of claim directed to the Board of Directors would 
have been intercepted by those that handle the mail and delivered to the UTA's 
general counsel, who along with the risk management office would handle the claim. 
(R. 200-01, depo. pp. 16-19, R. 231-32, depo. pp. 13-14) 
Only a brief synopsis of a claim is ever presented to the Board. According to 
the Board President, James Clark, virtually no substantive discussion of an injury 
claim occurs during any Board meeting. (R. 224-25, 232, depo. pp. 6-7, 14) 
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Moreover, the synopsis contains little more than the claim date, claimant name, type 
of claim, and requested settlement amount. (R. 225, depo. p.7 & R. 77) Of course 
the Board has no real need to read a notice of claim inasmuch as the tasks of 
investigating and settling such claims have been delegated by the Board to the risk 
management office. 
In other words, the UTA Board of Directors does not actually receive a 
notice of claim addressed to the Board. Utah courts have long recognized the 
principle that "the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act." Roundv 
v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, f 6, 984 P.2d 404 (quoting Beltranv. Allan. 926 P.2d 
892, 901 (Utah App. 1996)). Filing a notice of claim with the "UTA Board of 
Directors" would be a futile gesture, "an idle ceremony and of no avail." Carr v. ' 
Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah App. 1989) (citing the rule against 
futile acts with regard to tendering funds that will unquestionably be refused). , 
Inasmuch as the Governmental Immunity Act does not prescribe how a 
claimant should file a notice with the governing body of a political subdivision, it 
i 
was reasonable of the Serratos to send the notice to the persons they did. Had they 
sent the notice to the UTA board of directors, the notice would have been redirected 
I 
anyway. Concluding that only a notice addressed to the UTA board of directors is 
\ 
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valid under the Act would be to elevate "sheer literalism" over substance, as the 
Stahl court warned against. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 483. 
Each of the previously described factors, whether considered separately or in 
concert with one another, certainly justifies the determination to deliver the Serratos' 
notice of claim to Steven Cain and David Pitcher. The underlying purposes of the 
notice of claim requirement have still been validated. Accordingly, this Court 
should conclude that the Serratos' notice of claim filing was valid for the same 
reasons that the Larson and Bischel courts so concluded under the circumstances of 
those cases. 
V. Utah's Savings Statute Should Apply to Allow the Serratos to Refile Their 
Notice of Claim and then Their Complaint. 
Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code, often referred to as the "savings" statute, 
allows a plaintiff under certain circumstances to refile a complaint within one year 
of the plaintiff's action failing "otherwise than upon the merits" even though the 
statute of limitations may have run and the new action would be time barred. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). One purpose of section 78-12-40 "is to assure 
that claimants are not deprived of potentially valid suits by appeals that are not 
resolved until after the applicable periods of limitation run." Madsen v. Borthick. 
769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988). In accordance with that purpose, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that "if dismissal of a first action is appealed, section 78-12-40's 
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extension of time for filing a second action runs from the date of the dismissal's 
affirmance." IcL 
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court or by the 
service of a summons. Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Utah 1979). 
Accordingly, the Serratos' action was "commenced within due time" as is required 
under section 78-12-40 by the filing of their complaint within the statutory period. 
Moreover, the summary judgment granted against the Serratos was based 
upon the allegedly improper filing of the notice of claim. Nevertheless, the defect in 
filing the notice, if any, did not result in a judgment upon the merits. Instead, the 
judgment was based upon the failure of a precondition to suit. Accordingly, the 
savings statute should apply to give the Serratos an additional one year in which to 
refile the notice of claim and refile the complaint. 
This important principle was confirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in ^ 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) (hereinafter "Madsen II"). In the 
earlier proceedings, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (hereinafter 
i 
"Madsen I"), depositors in a finance company that became insolvent brought an 
action against the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
and the State, seeking reimbursement for lost deposits. The trial court dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a claim on the basis that the plaintiffs had completely 
l 
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failed to file a notice of claim with the governmental entity within the requisite one-
year period. IcL at 630. 
In Madsen IL the plaintiffs relied on Utah's savings statute to refile their 
complaint after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court again dismissed the 
complaint, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that failure to file the 
required notice of claim to the governmental entity amounted simply to a failure to 
satisfy a "precondition to suit." 769 P.2d at 250 (relying on Foil v. Ballinger. 601 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)). Thus, the savings statute allowed the plaintiffs to file a new 
complaint. 
Foil v. Ballinger involved the failure of the plaintiff to give a similar notice 
required under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-8. In Foil, the plaintiff's first action was commenced just prior to the period of 
limitations expiring, but the case was dismissed for failure to serve the notice of 
claim on the defendant doctor. Although the statute of limitations had run by the 
time the first case was dismissed, the plaintiff served the statutory notice upon the 
doctor and filed a new complaint. 
The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff, but the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the savings statute applied inasmuch as the 
first filed complaint 
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had the effect of "commencing the action." The subsequent dismissal 
of the [first action] was not a decision on the merits. Section 78-14-8 
merely prescribes a condition precedent to filing of a summons or 
complaint. A failure to comply with such conditions does not 
constitute an adjudication on the merits, but is merely a procedural 
defect that does not relate to the merits of the basic action in any way. 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 150. In other words, the plaintiff was allowed to serve a notice on 
the doctor and commence a new action even though no notice had been served prior 
to the limitations period expiring. 
Similarly, the Serratos timely filed their complaint, and any procedural defect 
relating to the Serratos' notice of claim certainly does not relate to the merits of their 
underlying claims. Accordingly, even if the Serratos1 filing of notice of claim in 
this case is somehow fatally defective, then section 78-12-40 should apply, and the 
Serratos should be able to file a notice of claim with the proper party and 
recommence their lawsuit. Foil and Madsen II would seem to compel such a 
conclusion. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
On the basis of the foregoing arguments and analysis, the Serratos 
respectfully request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the UTA and Mr. Sargent and denying the Serratos' 
motion for summary judgment. In addition, the Serratos further request that the 
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summary judgment and order be vacated and that the case be remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
DATED this ^ j > day of March, 2000. 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
G. ERIC NIELSDN 
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FILED 0IST rr COURT 
Third Juc ri District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
STATE OF UTAH 
SA^'LftKE COUNTY 
CRISTOBAL SEBJRATO and ELIDA 
SERRATO, 
Plaintiffs, 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
LANCE K. SARGENT, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 980903929PI 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod presiding, for a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment made on behalf 
of plaintiffs and defendants on August 2, 1999. Plaintiffs were represented by G. Eric 
Nielson and defendants were represented by Jody K Burnett. Following the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted 
by the parties, and being fully advised, issued its Minute Entry of August 5, 1999, in 
which it concluded that defendants Utah Transit Authority and Lance K. Sargent are 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to that decision, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
-^ viCl 
1. Defendants Utah Transit Authority's and Lance K. Sargent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby granted for the reasons set forth in 
defendants' memoranda, affidavits and exhibits in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
3. Plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon die 
merits, no cause of action. 
<jp»*-
DATED this ' % day of August, 1999. 
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NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR INJURY 
Steven Cain, Risk Manager 
Utah Transit Authority 
3600 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
BY PERSONAL SERVICE 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General of the State of Utah 
23 6 South Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
BY PERSONAL SERVICE 
David C. Pitcher, AIC 
Utah Transit Authority 
3600 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
BY PERSONAL SERVICE 
RE: My Clients: 
Date of Injury: 
Cristobal and Elida Serrato 
12/17/96 
Dear Ms. Graham and Messrs. Cain and Pitcher: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§63-30-11, et sea., (1995), as 
amended, you are hereby put on notice that my clients, Cristobal 
and Elida Serrato, have a claim for injury against the Utah Transit 
Authority and Lance K. Sargent, the driver of one of it's buses, 
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile/bus collision on 
or about December 17, 1996. This claim arises from the following 
facts. 
A BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS; THE NATURE 
OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED; AND, THE DAMAGES 
INCURRED BY THE CLAIMANTS SO FAR 
AS THEY ARE KNOWN 
On December 17, 1996, at approximately 6:40 am, Cristobal Serrato 
was driving his truck eastbound on 4715 South, on his way to work. 
Elida, Cristobal's wife, was riding with him. At the intersection 
of 4420 West and 4715 South, a UTA bus turned left in front of my 
client's vehicle. 
The driver of the UTA bus, Mr. Sargent, was negligent jfor^ jf ailing 
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NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Cristobal and Elida Serrato 
December 2, 1997 
Page 2 
dangerous left hand turn and failure to obey a traffic control 
device. As a result of the negligence of the driver of the bus, my 
clients have suffered serious personal injuries. 
As a result of the collision, Cristobal Serrato has sustained 
injuries to his neck, back and shoulders. Mr. Serrato has incurred 
medical expenses, lost wages and will likely incur future medical 
expenses related to the injuries suffered in this incident. 
My client Elida Serrato has sustained injuries to her face, head, 
and back, including multiple lacerations about her neck and face 
and broken teeth. Mrs. Serrato has incurred medical expenses, lost 
wages and will likely incur future medical expenses related to the 
injures suffered in this incident. Furthermore, Mrs. Serrato 
appears to have symptoms consistent with a closed-head injury. 
As a result of the negligence of the bus driver, my clients have 
suffered mental and physical pain and suffering, inconvenience and 
interference with the normal activities of daily living apart from 
gainful employment. 
Neither Cristobal nor Elida Serrato are under the age of majority 
or mentally incompetent. 
Sincerely, 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Steven R. Paul 
Attorney for Claimants 
SRP/sp 
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Subsection (1) and inserted "Eminent Domain" 
and made a related punctuation change in Sub-
section (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Pro-
cedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166. 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery 
of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be 
filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-
404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attor-
neys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the 
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 280, 
1991, ch. 259, 5 50; 1992, ch. 280, § 56. § 63 makes L. 1991, ch. 259 effective July 1, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- 1992. 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the refer-
ence to § 63-2-405 in Subsection (1). 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability, 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
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(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompe-
tent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claim-
ant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of 
claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; 
1991, ch. 76, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the sub-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Clear statement of claims required. 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Damages not specified. 
Failure to file claim. 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
—Nature of claim asserted. 
Waiver of objections by city. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement 
in giving the affected governmental entity an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem-
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties 
which might attend changes in administration 
provide sufficient justification for its imposi-
tion as to governmental but not other tort-fea-
sors, and therefore this section does not deny 
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977). 
Assignment of municipal debt . 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes 
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former 
law). 
Clear s tatement of claims required. 
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement 
section designations in Subsection (3)(b) and 
made related changes and deleted "or impris-
oned" after "legal guardian" and made related 
changes in Subsection (4)(a). 
is to require every claimant to state clearly all 
of the elements of his claims to the board of 
commissioners or city council for allowance as 
a condition precedent to his right to sue the 
city and recover his damages in an ordinary-
action. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 
134 P. 1167 (1913). 
Condit ions for right to recover. 
Statutory right to recover is available only 
upon compliance with the conditions upon 
which right is conferred. One who seeks to en-
force the right must by allegation and proof 
bring himself within the conditions prescribed 
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
Damages not specified. 
A claim that stated the time, place and gen-
eral nature of the injury and the sidewalk de-
fect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former 
section even though the amount of damages 
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed 
within thirty days of the injury, the exact 
amount of damages was impossible to ascer-
tain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former 
law). 
Fai lure to file claim. 
Because no claim was filed as required by 
this section, action to recover moneys expended 
to construct bridge which city had agreed to 
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Es-
tate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 
405 (1934). 
Exceptional circumstances were not present 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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quirement in this section. Edwards v. Hare, 
682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
Notice. 
Service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
(But see note under catchline "Federal claim" 
above.) 
This section requires that two notices of 
claim should have been filed by plaintiff: one to 
the attorney general and one to the agency 
concerned. Although this statutory require-
ment may result in redundant notice, the re-
dundancy apparently is mandated by the stat-
ute inasmuch as the Utah attorney general is 
the agent and legal counsel for all state agen-
cies, including the University of Utah. 
Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 
1445 (D. Utah 1990). 
The notice of claim provision would probably 
be interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court as 
applicable to all claims against state em-
ployees, whether or not any judgment might 
ultimately be payable by the state, as long as 
the employees' alleged acts were taken in the 
course of their employment. Kabwasa v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Utah 
1990). 
Quiet title actions. 
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with 
this section if it is given not more than one 
year after plaintiff's right to possession has 
been disturbed or encroached upon by the 
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977). 
Remedy for wrongful act. 
The 1978 amendment to § '63-30-4 did not 
leave the parents without a remedy for their 
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity 
for simple negligence to doctors employed by 
the state, since parents had a remedy against 
the state for injuries arising out of the negli-
gent acts of state employees, but the parents 
failed to give notice of their claim to the state 
within one year as required by this section. 
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1987). 
Cited in Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218 
(Utah 1989); O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Servs., 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts, 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Ter-
ritories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126. 
C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272, 
310. 
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed un-
der § 63-30-11. 
Key Numbers. — States «=» 174, 177, 197. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6. 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of 
Actions § 196. 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 120. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions <&=> 
82. 
78-12-39. Effect of war. 
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a country at war with the 
United States, the time of the continuance of the war is not a part of the period 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-39. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Wrongful death. 
Statute of limitations against action for 
wrongful death of alien enemy by personal 
representative of deceased was tolled by this 
section where only surviving heir of deceased 
was mother, likewise alien enemy. Platz v. In-
ternational Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 
187 (1923). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of 
Actions § 175. 
Key Numbers. 
113. 
Limitation of Actions @=» 
78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-40. 
Cross-References. — Survival of cause of 
action, §§ 78-11-12, 78-11-13. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amendment of pleadings. 
— Nonsuit. 
Application of section. 
— Timeliness. 
— Writs to enforce judgments. 
Cause of action. 
Commencement of one-year extension. 
— Affirmance of lower-court decision. 
— Dismissal. 
Conflict of laws. 
— Action dismissed in other state. 




"Merits" of action. 
—• Dismissal. 
— Nonsuit. 
Nonpayment of costs. 
— Presumption that second suit vexatious. 
Operation and effect of section. 
— Advantages. 
— Purpose. 
Pleading and proof of tolling. 
— Judicial notice. 
